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How to learn a conceptual space
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Abstract: The experiments proposed in the article by Steels & Belpaeme
(S&B) can be considered as a starting point toward a general methodology
for the automatic learning of conceptual spaces.
In recent years, several frameworks for cognitive robotics have
been proposed that take into account a level that is intermediate
between the “subsymbolic” low level, directly linked to the exter-
nal sensors, and the “linguistic” high level, oriented toward sym-
bolic inferences.
A cognitive intermediate level of this kind has been proposed
by Gärdenfors (2000). Different from other proposals, Gärdenfors
introduces an intermediate level, based on “conceptual spaces,”
with a precise geometric structure. Briefly, a conceptual space is
a metric space whose dimensions are related to the quantities pro-
cessed by the agent sensors. Examples of dimensions could be
color, pitch, volume, and spatial coordinates. Dimensions do not
depend on any specific linguistic description: A generic concep-
tual space comes before any symbolic-propositional characteriza-
tion of cognitive phenomena.
A point in a conceptual space is the epistemologically primitive
perceptive element at the considered level of analysis. Chella et
al. (1997; 2000) describe a robot vision system based on concep-
tual spaces in which each point corresponds to a geon-like 3-
dimensional geometric primitive (Biederman 1985) perceived by
the robot. Therefore, the perceived objects, like the agent itself,
other agents, the surrounding obstacles, and so on, are all recon-
structed by means of geons, and they all correspond to suitable sets
of points in the agent’s conceptual space. A related conceptual
space has been proposed by Edelman (1999), which also proposes
an implementation based on Radial Basis Functions (RBF) neural
networks. Song and Bruza (2003) adopted a conceptual space
framework for information retrieval applications, and Aisbett and
Gibbon (2001a) propose a suitable conceptual space for clinical
diagnosis applications. From a theoretical point of view, Gärden-
fors and Williams (2001) discuss the conceptual space approach
for generating nonmonotonic logic inferences, and Chella et al.
(2004) discuss conceptual spaces in the framework of the anchor-
ing problem in robotics. Balkenius (1998) proposes a more realis-
tic implementation of a conceptual space, from an empiric point
of view, by a set of RBF units, and Aisbett and Gibbon (2001b) dis-
cuss a related implementation based on voltage maps.
One of the problems with all of the previously cited approaches
is that the structure of the adopted conceptual spaces are a priori
defined by the designer according to the addressed problem, in
the sense that the designer has to define how many axes are nec-
essary for a correct representation of the problem at hand, what is
the meaning of the axes and the corresponding type and range of
values, what are the separable and the integral dimensions, and so
on. No general methodology has been adopted or proposed to al-
low the machine to inductively learn a conceptual space, with the
exception of the multidimensional scaling algorithm (Shepard
1962a; 1962b) proposed by Gärdenfors, which is generally not
suitable for real world robotic applications.
Analyzing the article by Steels and Belpaeme (S&B) from the
point of view of the conceptual space theory, the described agents
effectively build a conceptual space in order to represent the per-
ceived colors. A “category,” implemented by a RBF neural net-
work, identifies a subspace of integral dimensions of colors, be-
cause each RBF unit defines a color subdimension, whereas
different categories correspond to separable subspaces of colors.
Therefore, the color conceptual space of the agent is generated by
the union of all the subspaces of integral dimensions of colors cor-
responding to all the agent categories. The agent inner represen-
tation of a color is therefore given by the collection of the re-
sponses of all the RBF units built by the agent, that is, by the com-
ponents of the conceptual space dimensions, in agreement with
the conceptual space theory. It should be noted that each color
subspace is implemented by a RBF neural network, along the
lines of the approaches by Edelman and by Balkenius.
The new and important point brought forth in the S&B exper-
iments is that the agent conceptual space is not defined a priori by
the system designer, but it is learned by the agent itself according
to its inner and external constraints, as fully described in the tar-
get article. Therefore, the strategy adopted by S&B is effectively
able to address the previously described problem of how to learn
a conceptual space. Interestingly, the conceptual space is gener-
ated not only by means of the agent perceptions, but also by the
linguistic interactions among agents, that is, by means of the agent
actions.
Along this line, it would be interesting to investigate the possi-
bility for an agent to have more powerful representation capabil-
ities that allow the agent to infer the conceptual spaces of other
agents, through, for example, a sort of higher-order guessing
game. In this way, the problem of sharing categories among pop-
ulations could be correctly addressed, in the sense that an agent
belonging to a population Ax may build an inner representation of
the conceptual space of another agent belonging to a population
Ay to acquire all the needed capabilities to “translate” its own color
categories to the color categories of the other agent.
In conclusion, the S&B article is a seminal starting point for the
investigation of a general methodology for inferential learning of
conceptual spaces from an agent’s external perceptions, its inner
and external constraints, and its actions.
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Abstract: The general structure of Steels & Belpaeme’s (S&B’s) central
premise is appealing. Theoretical stances that focus on one type of mech-
anism miss the fact that multiple mechanisms acting in concert can pro-
vide convergent constraints for a more robust capacity than any individual
mechanism might achieve acting in isolation. However, highlighting the
significance of complex constraint interactions raises the possibility that
some of the relevant constraints may have been left out of S&B’s own mod-
els. Although abstract modeling can help clarify issues, it also runs the risk
of oversimplification and misframing. A more subtle implication of the sig-
nificance of interacting constraints is that it calls for a close relationship
between theoretical and empirical research.
Steels & Belpaeme’s (S&B’s) study attempts to combine research
objectives for robotics and human science. But, although using
human communication as a model may be a useful starting point
for robotics, the radical differences in physical constraints be-
tween robots and humans makes it unclear how much overlap
there need be between the two areas. The evolution of human
communication abilities occurred in a specific biological context,
with perceptual, motor, cognitive, social, and ecological con-
straints that don’t apply to robots. Exotic abilities like direct shar-
ing of perceptual information are possible for robots, and ulti-
mately the most effective robot communication systems may be
no more similar to human verbal communication than human
communication is to that of honeybees or dolphins. This is not to
suggest that there will be no important commonalities, but rather
to point out that divergent specific constraints can generate very
different possibilities.
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The study is at a sufficiently high level of abstraction that such
differences enter the picture only minimally. In taking inspiration
from categorization and naming by humans, S&B only focus on
the fact that humans are capable of open ended generation of so-
cially shared names, without attempting to model any specific bi-
ological or psychological mechanisms that may be involved. Such
a strategy offers the potential for generality, but it also faces chal-
lenges in demonstrating that the results will be robust against de-
partures from S&B’s assumptions, and that the models are infor-
mative despite the lack of realism. In their conclusion, S&B
suggest that additional realism would only obscure the dynamics,
but this very much depends on assuming that unmodeled con-
straints do not contribute to the dynamics.
Their primary hypothesis is that “embodiment and statistical
regularity of the environment is not enough to achieve sufficient
sharing for communication and that cultural constraints also play
a role.” However, this sounds suspiciously like its addressing an ill-
formed problem: What counts as “sufficient sharing” and “not
enough” may well be sensitive to a variety of factors and vary in
different contexts. For example, focal color categorization is pre-
sent in birds and might have been selected for because it simpli-
fies the cognitive demands of discriminating multiple items in an
array, be they landmarks in the environment (Tommasi & Vallor-
tigara 2004), potential mates (Bennett et al. 1997), or the incen-
tive value of different types of food (Gamberale-Stille & Tullberg
2001). Thus, task complexity is one dimension in which departures
from S&B’s assumptions could have a significant impact: The
complex task demands faced by birds may have favored focal color
categorization independent of any social referencing constraints.
The general problem is that it is very hard to know in advance
where and how such interrelations arise, and hence, it can be hard
to evaluate whether an abstract model has aptly represented the
issues.
Comparative research provides a strategy for disentangling
some of these kinds of complexities. In the case of color catego-
rization, birds and mammals are an informative contrast, given the
evolutionary radiation that separated these amniote groups from
a common ancestor, and the highly sophisticated visual abilities of
birds (Güntürkün 2000; Vallortigara 2004). Color perception is
more refined in avian species from the level of retinal photore-
ceptors, because the presence of double cones, oil droplets, and
tetrachromacy provide for earlier color-opponency processes than
those found in mammals (Vorobyev et al. 1998).
Birds are thus endowed with the structural and functional fea-
tures necessary to perceive, discriminate, and generalize color
stimuli. Selective pressures undoubtedly shaped color spaces in
the direction of those sensory aspects that are ecologically relevant
to the species. Some behavioral responses (e.g., feeding behavior)
are genetically biased in the direction of specific colors (Roper &
Marples 1997), but, not surprisingly, the development of chro-
matic perception is dependent on the statistical structure of the
colors experienced in the environment, because rearing newly
hatched birds in abnormally colored environments results in al-
terations of the spectral range to which the birds respond when
compared with control animals in color discrimination tests (Mik-
lósi et al. 2002).
As noted, birds have been shown not only to discriminate and
generalize colors, but also to categorize the color continuum in
discrete regions centerd around focal points, as found in humans
(Jones et al. 2001). Even more strikingly, birds have exhibited
spontaneous emergence of vocalizations akin to color naming.
Manabe et al. (1995) trained budgerigars to emit a high pitch call
in case of the presentation of one color and to emit a low pitch call
in case of the presentation of another color. Once this association
was learned, spontaneous differential vocalizations were observed
in response to forms when some new association of forms to col-
ors was being established, as if the birds were anticipating the pre-
sentation of a color by its learned vocal label. Research on parrot’s
chattering has provided evidence of color referencing mediated
by vocal communication and apparently equally depending on
both parrot–parrot and parrot–human observational learning
(Pepperberg & Wilcox 2000). Birds share a basic neural architec-
ture that is substantially different from that of mammals, and yet
their evolution independently achieved functions strikingly simi-
lar to humans, with the potential for categorization of color in ref-
erential communication.
Several points can be drawn from this. Comparing similar traits
across diverse phyla is a useful strategy for casting light on evolu-
tionary processes and biological mechanisms, and can help disen-
tangle the general from the specific. However, the differences also
make such comparisons fraught; analogies (e.g., describing a par-
ticular bird behavior as “naming”) must be drawn very carefully.
Similar problems of interpretation face theoretical modeling re-
search. If a bird species ever evolves language that involves color
naming, do S&B’s results imply that the color categories must be
socially shaped? We suggest that this is far from clear because it
isn’t clear how well the assumptions of S&B’s models will map to
the constraints operative in the particular evolutionary process.
Given the difficulty of predicting a priori which constraints, or
even which kinds of constraints, may prove relevant in evolution-
ary and cultural processes, there is reason to try to develop a close
coupling between empirical and theoretical research so that the
respective strengths and weaknesses can be balanced against each
other. In arguing this, we are not seeking to dismiss S&B’s work.
It is an elegantly structured study that may provide a robust mod-
eling platform for much productive theoretical exploration. But
closer empirical links will help its development.
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Abstract: Emphasizing that agents gain from culture-based patterns, I
consider the etiology of meaning. Since the simulations show that “shared
categories” are not based in learning, I challenge Steels & Belpaeme’s
(S&B’s) folk view of language. Instead, I stress that meaning uses indexi-
cals to set off a replicator process. Finally, I suggest that memetic patterns
– not words – are the grounding of language.
Using remarkable simulations, Steels & Belpaeme (S&B) show
why autonomous robots can gain from sensitivity to culture-based
patterns. These can be used to supplement categories grounded
in embodiment and, as a result, actions can be better coordinated.
The simulations thus illuminate “how the memetic evolution of
language and meaning is possible” (sect. 4.3). In this commen-
tary, stressing that agents use indexical signs, I focus on the etiol-
ogy of meaning. Language itself, I suggest, may depend on how
grounded categories interact with memetic patterns or indexical
signs.
Although “sharing” develops in genetic simulations, as for color,
this may be gross. Equally, as with herring gull chicks, it may de-
pend on “relational signs” that arise in the niche (Tinbergen 1953).
Further, the simulations show that shared categories will not arise
from individual learning. Mapping a word-form to a color is, for
this reason, beyond autonomous devices that lack sensitivity to
culture-based patterns. It becomes possible, however, provided
that an encultured pattern is consistently coupled with what sen-
sors can detect. Given learning, coupling can give a population
grounded relational categories.
S&B draw on a folk view of language. Taking shared categories
for granted, they assume that a lexicon maps words onto mean-
ings. Accordingly, they adopt what has been called the “funda-
mental assumption of linguistics” – the view that, “in every speech
community, some utterances are alike in form and meaning”
(Bloomfield 1935, p. 78; for critique, see Love 2003). In spite of
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